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I. Introduction
Several years ago Phillip Nelson observed that certain problems arise in extending search theory to deal with nonhomogeneous goods. In particular, he noted that "information about quality differs from information about price because the former is usually more expensive to buy than the latter" (1970, p. 311) . To analyze the implications of this observation, Nelson divided goods into two classes, search goods and experience goods. Search goods are those for which utility is assessed before purchase by actual inspection. Experience goods are those for which utility is assessed after purchase by actual consump tion.
These definitions turn out to be very strong. So strong, in fact, that they lead to some difficulties. Consider, for example, experience goods. For these goods utility is assessed after purchase by actual consumption. But at least the price is observed before purchase. Since for experience goods this cannot, by definition, affect the choice of which brand to buy, Nelson was forced to assume that "consumers either sample at random from among all brands or from among those brands in the price range the consumer deems appropriate for him self" ( 1970, p. 313) . These assumptions require that consumers either ignore prices completely or have perfect information regarding prices, neither of which seems likely.
The problem with Nelson's definitions is that goods generally pos sess a number of characteristics which can differ in their degree of observability. Thus a good might possess some "search characteristics" and·some "experience characteristics." Furthermore, whether a par ticular characteristic is a search characteristic or an experience char acteristic ought to be endogenously determined by the consumer.
In previous work, I have analyzed a model in which goods are described by precisely two characteristics, price and quality. The mar ket is described by an exogenous distribution of these characteristics. Sampling from this distribution is assumed to be costly. Once an observation is drawn, price is observed costlessly. Quality, however, can never be observed before purchase. In this case quality is an extreme example of an experience characteristic, one for which the cost of observation prior to purchase is infinite. The present paper extends this model to allow quality to be observed at some finite cost. The purpose is to explicate the relationships between information costs, duration of search, and turnover.1 This model; introduced in Wilde (1980) , applies to a number of cases discussed by Nelson. For example, it formalizes his prototypic experience good, canned tuna fish. Nelson suggested that "to evaluate brands of canned tuna fish, for example, the consumer would almost certainly purchase brands of tuna fish for consumption. He could, then, determine from several purchases which brand he preferred. For tuna fish there is no effective search alternative open. At the low price of experience, there is insufficient demand for specialized es tablishments selling tastes of various brands of tuna fish" ( 1970, p. 312) . In this case, Nelson seems to be suggesting that the "price of experience" is low because the price of the good is low. However, the price of experience can be low for other reasons as well. For example, if there is little variance in quality, then the price of experience is low because there is little chance of purchasing a low-quality good. In fact, it will turn out that by allowing quality to be observed before purchase an explicit expression for the price of experience can be derived. Utilizing this expression, this paper will also explicate the relationship between information costs and the price of experience.
The focus of the model developed in Section II is on an imperfectly informed consumer who is interested in maintaining a flow of con sumption of a good which is described by price and quality. The market offers various combinations of price and quality, but the consumer cannot costlessly observe them; by paying a search cost he or she can sample a good from the market, but only price is observed. Quality can be observed either before purchase by actual inspection (at some additional cost) or after purchase by actual consumption. Whether quality is observed before purchase (herein called inspec tion) or after purchase (herein called evaluation), the consumer can return to the market and resample if the observed quality is too low. The initial problem is to characterize the optimal strategy for a con sumer in such an environment. For a fixed utility function, joint distribution of price and quality, and cost of search, three possibilities arise depending on the cost of inspection: (1) If the cost of inspection is low enough, inspection will be the optimal strategy for low prices and drawing a new observation will be the optimal strategy for high prices. (2) If the cost of inspection is of an intermediate amount, evaluation will be the optimal strategy for low prices, inspection will be the optimal strategy for intermediate prices, and drawing a new observation will be the optimal strategy for high prices. (3) If the cost of inspection is high enough, evaluation will be the optimal strategy for low prices and drawing a new observation will be the optimal strategy for high prices.
The formal results of the paper relate to the characterization of the consumer's optimal strategy which is summarized by statements 1-3 above. However, these results have broad implications. Three im portant general observations emerge from the analysis.
First, as mentioned above, the price of experience can be defined analytically. This is important because it allows one to differentiate between the direct, short-run benefits of purchasing a good which are derived from its consumption and the indirect, long-run benefits of purchasing a good which are derived from evaluation of its quality attributes.
Second, it will be demonstrated that in some cases quality will be a pure search characteristic (statement 1 above), in some cases it will be neither a pure search characteristic nor a pure experience character istic (statement 2 above), and in some cases it will be a pure experience characteristic (statement 3 above). Hence, not only is determining whether a particular good is an experience good or a search good a complex matter, but so is determining whether a particular charac teristic of that good is an experience characteristic or a search char acteristic. Since these distinctions have become very popular in the literature it is important to understand their limitations.
Finally, the comparative statics associated with the characterization of the consumer's optimal strategy will show that the theoretical foundations of much of the empirical work on duration of search and turnover in labor markets and marriage markets are unsound.
A number of specific empirical predictions are also derived. It is shown that quality is more likely to be a search attribute (I) the lower is the cost of search, (2) the lower is the cost of inspection, (3) the higher is the price of the good, and (4) the larger is the variation in utility due to quality relative to the variation in utility due to price. Similarly, it is shown that quality is more likely to be an experience attribute (1) the higher is the cost of search, (2) the higher is the cost of inspection, (3) the lower is the price of the good, and (4) the smaller is the variation in utility due to quality relative to the variation in utility due to price. It is also shown that regardless of whether quality is a search attribute or an experience attribute, increases in search costs decrease the duration of search. In general, increases in inspection costs have ambiguous effects on the duration of search, but it is argued that if the variation in utility due to quality relative to the variation in utility due to price is low, increases in inspection costs are likely to increase the duration of search (at least by one measure).
Finally, considerable attention is focused on turnover. Again, in the most general setting results tend to be ambiguous. This is especially true regarding the relationship between search costs and turnover. However, it is argued that if the variation in utility due to quality relative to the variation in utility due to price is low, increases in inspection costs are likely to increase turnover. This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the basic model. Section III considers the three cases mentioned above: (a) in which quality is always observed before purchase; (b) in which quality is observed before purchase for some prices but is observed after purchase for other prices; and (c) in which quality is always observed after purchase. Section IV discusses the empirical implications of the model in the labor market and the marriage market. Section V pro vides a brief conclusion. In this section the basic model will be developed and an analytical expression for the price of experience derived. Section III provides comparative statics for the three cases mentioned in the introduction.
Assume the good which is sought by the consumer has a lifetime of one period. Let U(p, q) be the total net value to the consumer of purchasing and consuming the good characterized by price p and quality q, where U is differentiable and bounded on R+ X R+ with aU!ap < 0 and auJaq > 0. Let </J(p, q) be the consumer's subjective estimate of the market density of P and Q. For mathematical conve nience, assume <P is strictly positive on R+ X R+· Definef(p) as the marginal density of P and g(q I p) as the conditional density of Q given P = p, both based on </J.
The cost of drawing an observation at random from <Pis cs, where cs � 0. The cost of observing the true vqlue of Q prior to purchase is Cn where Cr � 0 (both cs and cr are measured in the same units as U).
The consumer can sample as many observations as desired from <P at the beginning of each period. Any number of inspections are also allowed. However, the consumer demands precisely one unit of the good each period. 2 The consumer's objective is to maximize his or her expected discounted utility of consumption net of search costs. Sam pling is assumed to be without recall, the horizon is infinite, and the discount rate is {3, where 0 < f3 < 1. Now suppose the consumer has sampled a good priced at p. Three reactions are possible: sample again without observing quality; inspect quality and then either buy the good forever or sample again; or evaluate quality and then either buy the good forever or sample again. Let v (p) be the expected value of drawing an observation of p and then proceeding optimally. Then
where V is the expected value of search (i.e., the expected value of v[p] taken with respect tof),B(p) is the expected value of buying the good without observing quality and then proceeding optimally, and T(p) is the expected value of testing quality prior to purchasing the good and then proceeding optimally.
To defineB(p) and T(p) analytically, observe fi rst that, once quality is known, the value of the optimal policy is the same whether quality is observed via inspection or evaluation. In other words, once quality has been observed, it is irrelevant how it was observed-any asso-ciated costs will by then be sunk costs. Define the value of the optimal policy once quality is known as k(p). Then
where q*(p) is that quality level which makes the consumer indifferent between consuming the good characterized by [p, q*(p)] and search ing again for a new good from cp. That is, q*(p) is defined by U[p, q*(p)] = V(l -{3). The logic of (2) is that if q < q*(p), then the consumer rejects the good and samples again, receiving V (the ex pected value of search). This happens with probability G [q*(p) Ip]. If q;:,: q*(p), then the good is acceptable and the consumer receives the conditional expected value of U(p, q)l(I -/3), given q ;:,: q*(p).
Using k(p), bothB (p) and T(p) are defined straightforwardly. If the consumer buys the good priced at p, he or she receives the expected utility of consumption, given quality is unknown, plus the discounted value of an optimal policy once quality is known. Hence
If the consumer tests for quality prior to purchase, he or she pays cr and receives the undiscounted value of an optimal policy once quality is known. Hence 
brackets is a cost which is directly comparable to Cr. That is, one can
Equation (5) provides an analytical expression for Nelson's price of experience. Furthermore, it has a natural interpretation. Recall that k(p) is the expected value of an optimal policy once quality is known, given the observed price is p. When quality is observed via actual consumption, this value is not obtained for one period (since in this model the good lasts for precisely one period). Hence (I -f3)k(p) is the gross opportunity cost of consuming the good, given quality is unknown. But consumption of the good yields utility, in this case EU(p, Q). The net opportunity cost of consuming the good, given quality is unknown, is the difference between these two quantities.
In analyzing the optimal policy it will be convenient to make a transformation of variables in the definition of k(p). Since it is ulti-JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY mately final utility which matters to the consumer, the focus of (2) can be shifted from the conditional distribution of quality given price to the conditional distribution of utility given price. That is, let 'l'(w I p) be the conditional distribution of utility given
where z(p) = limq___ ,00U(p, q). Integrating (6) by parts gives
This form of k(p) is intuitively less appealing than (6), but it is more powerful. For example, using (5) it is easy to show from (7) that
where i(p) = U(p, 0). Expressing the price of experience in this form is useful analytically since it makes the comparison between B (p) and T(p) easier. Conceptually, it helps identify factors which might affect the decision whether to observe quality before purchase or after purchase. For example, suppose the cost of search, cs, increases. Then surely the value of an optimal policy will fall, that is, 8V!acs < 0.
Equation (8) suggests that the price of experience will then fall as well. Hence the higher is the cost of search, the more likely it is that evaluation will be optimal. These and other results will be formalized in the following section. First, however, a few more preliminary as sumptions will be needed.
Using the definition of cB(p) introduced above in equation (5), the functional equation (1) can be rewritten as
The . next step in characterizing an optimal policy is to compare V, k(p)
-cB(p), and k(p) -Cr. Unfortunately, without more structure on the joint distribution of price and quality, any number of things can happen. Nelson recognized this problem as well, stating the following: "Prior to using [a] brand, all the consumer knows is its price. But this knowledge provides only the roughest sort of guide to choice, for the consumer must assume a generally positive relationship between price and quality. In the absence of any other information, the consumer would not know if he were better off experimenting with low-or high-priced brands" (1970, p. 313). To get around this problem, Nelson converts the joint distribution of price and quality to a dis tribution of net utility and proceeds under the assumption that evalu ation is always used to observe quality. In the present analysis, since the decision whether to observe quality before purchase or after purchase is endogenous, a more formal approach is needed. The standard assumption is that 8'11 (w I p)/ap > 0. This assumption im plies that, on average, higher price is associated with lower utility even though higher price may well be associated with higher quality. Be cause this assumption is discussed at length in Wilde (1980) , it will be assumed to hold here without further rationalization. 4 ,Several implications follow directly from the assumption that a'l'(w Ip )lap > 0. First, it implies that the price of experience is increasing in the price of the good. To see this, simply take the derivative of (8) with respect to p:
that observing quality before purchase becomes a less desirable alter native to sampling again as the observed price increases. That is, using
Hence observing quality after purchase also becomes a less desirable alterna tive to sampling again as the observed price increases, and it does so at an even faster rate than observing quality before purchase.
III. The Optimal Policy
It turns out that three qualitatively distinct forms of the optimal policy are possible. If cr is low enough, then inspection always dominates evaluation. If cr is somewhat higher, then evaluation dominates in-spection for one set of prices and inspection dominates evaluation for another set of prices; and, if er is high enough, then evaluation always dominates inspection. These three cases are analyzed next.
A.
Inspection Only
In comparing the expected value of observing quality before pur chase to the expected value of observing quality after purchase, the crucial parameters are er and cB(p), the respective costs of these two activities. It is clear from (3) and (4) thatB(p) � T(p) as cr � cB(p). But cB (p) is increasing in p so that cB (0) � er implies cB(p) � er for all p � 0.
Hence the expected value of observing quality before purchase will. always be greater than the expected value of observing quality after purchase when cB(O) > er. This is obviously most likely to be the case when cB(O) is large and er is small. Equation (8) suggests that cB(O) is most likely to be large when V(l -/3) is significantly greater than i (O). (0) is most likely to be large when q*(O) is high. In other words, inspection is likely to dominate evaluation for all prices when the cost of inspection is low or when few quality levels are acceptable even at low prices. The latter is the case, for example, when the cost of drawing observations from cp is low or the variation in utility due to quality is high relative to the variation in utility due to price.5
In the remainder of this subsection it will be assumed that cB(O) � er; that is, it will be assumed that
This implies that B (p) ,,,; T(p) for all p � 0, in which case B (p) can be ignored completely; characterizing the optimal policy reduces to comparing T(p) and V. Two possibilities arise. In the fi rst there exists a unique fi nite price, say p:, such that observing quality prior to purchase is optimal for p ,,,; P: and sampling again is optimal for p � P: (see fig. 1 ). The critical price is defi ned by V = T(#).6 In the second, V is strictly less than T(p) for all p � 0 so that observing quality prior to purchase is always optimal.7
5 There is no guarantee that cB(p) > 0. In particular, it might be the case that c8(0) = 0. It can be shown, however, that there exists E > 0 such that cB(O) > 0 if Cs < E.
6 Since a'l'(w I p)!ap > 0 only implies T'(p) � 0, it is possible that the e q uation T(p) = V does not have a unique solution. However, if this is the case, then {p I T(p) = V} == [p*, oo) , where P* = inf {p I T(p) = V}. If P* is defined in this fa shion, it satisfies the formal requirements stated in the text.
7 Formal proofs of these assertions have been omitted since they are trivial. It is apparent, however, that since c8(0) ;;,, 0, there is always a small enough value of cr (possibly 0) such that B(p) � T(p) for all p ;;,, 0.
Assume thatp� exists and,is finite. Then p� andq* partitionR+ X R+ into three sets (see fig. 2 ). In region I, p > P:, so the good is rejected outright. In region 11, p � P: but q < q*(p), so that quality is observed prior to purchase but the good is subsequently rejected (i.e., not purchased). In region III, p � P: and q � q*(p), so that quality is observed prior to purchase and the good is subsequently accepted (i.e., purchased). How do changes in cs and cr affect this partition? To answer this question one needs to know how changes in cs and cr affect P: and q*.
The following results are straightforward but tedious and can be found in the (unpublished) Appendix to this paper. It is shown there that dp:tdcs > 0 and dp:tdcr < 0. Of course V falls as either cs or cr rises. Since U[p, q*(p)] = V(l -{3) by definition and U is increasing in q, this implies dq*(p)ldcs < 0 and dq*(p)ldcr < 0. In other words, an increase in the cost of drawing observations from <P will make inspec tion an optimal strategy for more prices while an increase in the cost of inspection will make inspection an optimal strategy for less prices. An increase in either cost will make more quality levels acceptable for any given price. Next, consider how changes in cs and cr affect the number of observations which must be drawn from <P (whether or not quality is inspected) before an acceptable good is found. Define
-Price-quality combinations, case A: I = reject outright, II = inspect and subsequently reject, III = inspect and subsequently accept.
I. P T
ls= 0 {l -G[q*(p) I p]}j(p)dp and IF= I o P T G[q*(p) I p]j(p)dp.
Here IF is the probability that a random price-quality combination will be inspected and rejected, and ls is the probability that a random price-quality combination will be inspected and accepted. It is ag-ain shown in the Appendix that the following hold: 8lsf 8cs > 0 and 8JF/8cs � 0, while 8lsf8cr � 0 and 8/F/acr < 0.
Consider first an increase in the cost of drawing observations. Since P: increases, inspection becomes an optimal strategy for more prices.
Furthermore, since q*(p) decreases, more quality levels are acceptable for any given price. Hence the expected number of observations which must be drawn from cf> before an acceptable good is found (Ills) falls. The effect of an increase in cs on IF is ambiguous, how ever, because the decrease in q*(p) counteracts the increase in P :
rather than reinforcing it.
Precisely the opposite happens when the cost of inspection in creases. Since P: falls, inspection becomes an optimal strategy for less prices. Furthermore, since q*(p) still decreases, fewer quality levels are acceptable for any given price. Hence IF falls. Since the effect on Is is ambiguous, it is impossible to assert that an increase in the cost of inspection reduces the expected number of observations which must be drawn from cf> before an acceptable good is found.
B. Inspection and Evaluation
It was assumed throughout Section IIIA that c n(O) �Cr so that inspec tion dominated evaluation for all prices. Recall that
It is apparent from this equation that 8cn(0)/8cs < 0 and 8cn(0)/8cr < 0 since V is decreasing in either cost and 'l'(w I 0) > 0 for w close to i(O). Hence increases in either cs or cr make it less likely that inspec tion will dominate evaluation for all prices.
Assume that cn(O) < cr. Then two possibilities arise. In the first, inspection is optimal for one set of prices and evaluation is optimal for another set of prices. In the second, inspection is never optimal. The first possibility will be analyzed now and the second will be considered in Section IIIC.8 In order for inspection to be optimal for one set of prices and evaluation to be optimal for another set of prices two conditions must be met. Assuming cB(O) < er, the first can be stated as follows.
C ONDITION 1: The cost of inspection must not be so great that evaluation dominates inspection for all prices.
When condition 1 holds, since B '(p) � T' (p) � 0, there exists a fi nite price Pir such that evaluation dominates inspection for p � Pir and inspection dominates evaluation for p � P ir· The critical price is defined by T( f h) = B(Pir) (see fig. 3 ).
. Assuming condition 1 holds, the second condition can be stated as follows.
C ONDITION 2: The expected return to search must be low enough that for some prices inspection dominates drawing another observation from cf>.
Condition 2 requires that for some p > Pir, T(p) > V. However, as in case A, it might be that T(p) > V for all p � P�r· Assume this does not hold. Then there exists a finite price p� such that inspection is optimal for p E [p ir, p�], and drawing another observation from cf> is optimal for p � p�. Again, as in Section IIIA, the critical price is defined by T(p�) = V (see fig. 3 ). 9
Overall, the situation dealt with in this case is the most interesting of the model because it shows that quality can be a search characteristic for some prices and an experience characteristic for other prices. That is, the configuration of utility, search costs, inspection costs, and the joint distribution of price and quality are such that inspection, evaluation, and drawing another observation from cf> are all optimal strategies for various prices. In general, p�, Pir, and q* partition R+ X R+ into five regions (see fi g. 4). As in case A, region I includes prices to be optimal for one set of prices and evaluation to be optimal for another set of prices. There seems to be little value in making these more formal. for which rejecting the good outright is optimal. In region II, p;r < p �pf but q < q*(p), so that quality is observed prior to purchase but the good is subsequently rejected; and in region III, p;r < p � P"f, but q;;,: q*(p), so that quality is observed prior to purchase and the good is subsequently accepted. There are two additional regions, though. In region IV, p � p;r and q < q*(p), so that the good is purchased without quality having been observed but is not repurchased. In region V, p � p;r and q;;,: q*(p), so that the good is purchased without quality having been observed and is repurchased in all subsequent periods.
How do changes in cs and cr affect this partition? As before, to answer this question we need to know how changes in cs and cr affect Pir, pf, and q*(p). As in case A, dpfldcs > 0 and dpfldcr < 0. Also, dp;rldcs > 0 and dp;rldcr > 0. Finally, dq*(p)ldcs < 0 and dq*(p)ldcr
An increase in the cost of drawing observations will increase the set of prices for which evaluation is an optimal strategy. Furthermore, it will increase the set of prices for which either inspection or evaluation is an optimal strategy. An increase in the cost of inspection will increase the set of prices for which evaluation is an optimal strategy, will decrease the set of prices for which inspection is an optimal strategy, and will decrease the set of prices for which either inspection or evaluation is an optimal strategy. Finally, an increase in either cs or cr will make more quality levels acceptable at any given price.
It is again useful to consider how increases in cs and cr affect the probability that a random price-quantity combination will fall in any given region. Define f.PB r
f.PB r EF = 0 G[q*(p) IPlf(p)dp, ls= J:f· {l -G[q*(p) IP]}f(p)dp, PJJ r and IF = L;: G[q*(p) IPJJ(p)dp.
Here IF, ls, EF, and Es are the probabilities a random price-quality combination will fall in region II, III, IV, or V, respectively. It can be shown that 
8(ls +Es)�
O a < .
Cr
While the majority of these partial derivatives are ambiguous in sign, a number of interesting observations can still be made. First, the probability that a random price-quality combination will be acceptable (whether quality is inspected or evaluated) is given by ls+ Es. Hence the expected number of observations needed to locate an acceptable good is Il(I s + Es). As before, this quantity is decreasing in cs and ambiguous in Cr. Second, both 8Esl8cs > 0 and 8Esl8cr > 0. That is, the probability that a random price-quality combination will be pur chased without quality having been observed and subsequently repur chased is increasing in either cost. This is because when either cs or Cr increases, the set of prices for which evaluation is optimal increases and the set of quality levels which are acceptable for any given price also increases. However, this necessarily implies aE F/acs and aE F/acr are ambiguous in sign. This last observation is important. When a price-quality combination falls in region IV, the good is purchased without quality having been observed but is not subsequently repur chased. This "brand disloyalty" is analogous to a job quit in the labor market or a divorce in the marriage market. It is crucial to recognize that the likelihood of these events does not appear to be systematically related to either search costs or inspection costs. This point will be discussed in more detail in Section IV. 
C. Evaluation Only
The final case is one in which cn(O) < cr, but one of the conditions of case B does not hold.10 Under these circumstances evaluation will always dominate inspection for any acceptable price.11 Both this case and case A are, in a sense, special cases of case B. Here the relevant critical price, p;, is defined by B (pit) = V (see fig. 5 ). The elements of the associated partition correspond to regions I, IV, and V of case B (see fig. 6 ). Of course cr has no effect on this partition. The effects of c8 are identical to those in case B (where p; now replaces Pitr).
IV. Applications
The model analyzed in this paper has obvious analogues in the labor market and the marriage market. The product market has been used as the setting to this point because much of the relevant literature deals with consumer behavior (e.g., Nelson 1970; Lippman and
•0 This will certainly be the case when cT is large enough, since U is bounded.
11 That is, B(p) "" T(p) for any p such that V < max {B(p), T(p)}. 1979a; Wilde 1980; and Hey and McKenna 1981) . However, many of the important qualitative implications of the model emerge more sharply in the labor market than in the product market.
McCall
The labor market analogue concerns an unemployed worker searching for a job. This individual pays a search cost in order to sample vacancies, but only the wage rate is observed. Nonwage char acteristics can be observed either by paying an inspection cost or by taking the job.
Two aspects of the labor market analogue are of primary inter est-unemployment and the quit rate. Unemployment is related to the expected duration of search. The quit rate is related to the probability that a job which is accepted will subsequently be rejected.
Suppose that the distributions of net utility associated with jobs, conditional on the wage rate, are stochastically decreasing in the wage rate. Then, in the most interesting case, there will be a range of low wages for which renewing search is optimal, a range of intermediate wages for which inspection is optimal, and a range of high wages for which evaluation is optimal (see Sec. IIIB above).
The effects of an increase in information costs on the duration of search seem straightforward. An increase in the cost of search makes both inspection and evaluation more desirable alternatives. Hence the duration of search should fall. An increase in the cost of inspection will likely have ambiguous effects on the duration of search because it makes evaluation a more desirable alternative, but it also makes in spection a less desirable alternative.
The effects of an increase in information costs on the quit rate are less obvious. The argument would seem to go as follows: A quit requires that two events occur: (1) a wage rate is observed for which it is optimal to take the job without observing its nonwage component first and (2) the nonwage component turns out to be too low so that it is optimal to quit and renew search once it is observed. But an increase in either search costs or inspection costs makes evaluation optimal for more wages. In particular, there are lower wages for which evaluation is now optimal. These jobs must have higher nonwage components in order to be acceptable; that is, for them the probability of turnover is higher. Hence, the overall probability of a quit should increase as either cost increases.
Unfortunately, these heuristics are incomplete because neither con siders the fact that an increase in either c8 or Cr will decrease the return to search, making lower values of the nonwage component acceptable at any given wage. While this reinforces the argument regarding the relationship between information costs and the dura tion of search, it weakens the argument regarding the relationship between information costs and the quit rate. In fact, an increase in either cost could either increase or decrease the quit rate.12
To justify these assertions formally the model of Section III must be used. Consider first the duration of search. There are really two measures which are of interest. First, Es + ls gives the probability that a random price-quality observation will ultimately be acceptable (re gardless of how quality is observed). Second, EF +E s+ ls gives the probability that a random price observation will cause search to cease (although perhaps only temporarily 
Cr
Purchases of goods for which quality has not been observed are really part of the search process. Hence l/(Es +ls), which might be called the "pure duration of search," is the proper expression for the ex pected duration of search. However, empirically it would often be impossible to differentiate between observations which fall in region IV and observations which fall in region V. In other words, the observed duration of search would often correspond to l/(E F +Es + ls), which might be called the "effective duration of search."
Similar problems arise with respect to turnover. In fact, there are three measures of turnover embedded in this model, one ex ante and two ex post. The ex ante measure is simply E F; it gives the probability that a random price-quality observation will be purchased once and only once. One ex post measure is what might be called the "pure failure rate for evaluation," EF = Ep/(EF + Es); it gives the conditional probability that a good will be rejected given that it is purchased without quality having been observed. However, empirically it would often be hard to differentiate between observations which fall in region III and observations which fall in region V. Hence the other ex post measur� is what might be called the "effective failure rate for evaluation," EF = Ep/(EF +Es+ ls); it gives the conditional probabil ity that a good will be rejected given that it is purchased (regardless of whether quality is observed before purchase or after purchase). It turns out that none of these measures is systematically related to either search costs or inspection costs.
The third application of this theoretical framework is to the mar riage market. The marriage market analogue concerns an unwed individual searching for a marriage partner. This individual pays a search cost in order to sample potential partners, but only some characteristics are observed. Other characteristics can be observed either by paying an inspection cost or by getting married.
The aspect of the marriage market analogue which is of primary interest is dissolution. The most complete analysis of the relationship between information costs and probability of dissolution is provided by Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977) . These authors consider two cases, one in which remarriage is impossible and one in which the remarriage market is identical to the marriage market.
· Consider first the case in which remarriage is impossible. When remarriage is impossible, the value of dissolution is a constant. In the model analyzed in this paper an analogous assumption is that the value of not repurchasing a good is a constant, say V. Then instead of (3), B (p) would be defined as
where
would remain as in (4). This modification affects the comparative statics of the model in a straightforward way; for p .;;; p �r. dij*(p) Ides = 0 = dij*(p) ldcr. Hence as before, 8E8/8c8> 0 and 8E8/8cr> 0, but now 8EF/ac8 > 0 and 8EF!acr > 0. Furthermore, as before, 8E8/ac8 < 0 and 8EF/8cr > 0, but now 8E8/acr < 0 and 8EF/8cr > 0. However, it remains true, �ven when the value of not repurchasing a good is constant, that Es and EF bear no systematic relationship to informa tion costs. These results are, on the surface, consistent with those of Becker, Landes, and Michael. These authors assert that because "the proba bility of entering into a mismatch" would be greater, "an increase in either the cost of intensive or extensive search would increase the probability of dissolution" ( 1977, p. 1150).13 The defi nition of "prob ability of dissolution" which these authors use to arrive at this theoretical conclusion is apparently E F· The problem is that E F is " unobservable (it isE F which is observed), and even w, hen remarriage is 13 Intensive search corresponds to inspection and extensive search corresponds to drawing another observation from cf>. Hence the cost of intensive search is Cr and the cost of extensive search is cs.
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,, impossible, there is no systematic relationship between EF and either Cs or Cr! The situation is even more difficult when the remarriage market is identical to the marriage market. Here, just as in the labor market analogue, none of the partial derivatives relating information costs to turnover can be signed.
These are, of course, somewhat negative observations. In addition, some positive conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. It has been shown that an increase in search costs always decreases the duration of search. An increase in inspection costs will generally increase the duration of search if the effect on q*(p) is small relative to the effect on Pir or p�. This will be the case when the variation in utility due to quality is small relative to the variation in utility due to price.
There appear to be no general conclusions to be drawn regarding the relationship between search costs and turnover. However, as above, an increase in inspection costs will generally increase turnover if the effect on q*(p) is small relative to the effect on Pir or p � . This is again the case when the variation in utility due to quality is small relative to the variation in utility due to price.
V. Conclusion
This paper has established a number of strong results which go against the grain of the extant literature. These results obtain because goods are viewed as multicharacteristic composites in which indi vidual characteristics have specific informational properties.
A number of extensions are possible. An obvious one is to consider goods which are described by more than one nonprice attribute. In this case the consumer would need to decide which attributes to observe before purchase and which to observe after purchase. At each stage, reservation levels would be defined as functions of the actual levels of those attributes already observed. Finally, the consumer would also need to decide in which order to observe attributes. A model of this nature would have important applications in psychology and consumer research, as well as economics. However, one might argue that actual consumers do not use optimizing strategies as com plicated as this model would require. Rather, consumers would use various satisficing strategies. In fact, one might apply the same argu ment to the model analyzed in this paper.
There is much to be said for this argument, but satisficing strategies are even less well understood than optimizing strategies. Further more, most empirical work on the duration of search and turnover is based, implicitly or explicitly, on simpler versions of the optimizing model developed in t h is paper (e.g., Becker, Landes, and Michael 
